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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to
Section 8-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code, Annotated 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD)
ISSUE NO. 1
1st ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
IS UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402 (3) AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE OF
THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS?
A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed for correctness
as a question of law. State v. Kruezer. slip op., Case No. 981035-CA (Utah
App. Feb. 25,1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3) State v Jones, 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. App.
1984); State v Prentiss, 786 P. 2d 932, 935 (Ariz. 1989); State v Dykes, 789 P.2d
1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990; People v Tenorio, 473 P. 2d 993, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 94
(Cal. 1970); Estevbar v Municipal Court, 485 P. 2d 1140, 5 Cal. 3d 119 (Cal.
1971); People v Superior Court, 520 P. 2d 405 (Cal. 1974); In re Inquiry
Concerning a Judge, 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998); In re Inquiry Concerning a
Judge, 1999 UT 6, 976 P. 2d 581. Preserved for appeal at [R. 619-625].
Walker Brief
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ISSUE NO. 2
2na ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
THE PROOF ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFENSE.
Defendant / Appellant was convicted of Securities Fraud having been
charged in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2) (b)
(1953, as amended). The evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that:
a. the Defendant / Appellant made statements, or failed to disclose,
in connection with an offering of a security;
b. the Defendant / Appellant knew of thefraudulentnature of the
investment plan when he talked to Mr. Sorenson, or when he
wire transferred the investment money.
See State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 2000.UT.0042150 f 18.
To determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to convict a defendant, we do not examine
whether we believe that the evidence at trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather,
we will conclude that the evidence was insufficient
when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences
drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive, or
inherently improbable, that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he, or she, was
convicted." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah
1993).
Quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983): We reverse a
jury conviction, for insufficient evidence, only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive, or inherently improbable, that reasonable minds must
Walker Brief
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have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161,1168 (1980);
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); State v. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d
761, 762 (1979); State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 (1978); State v.
Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216,219 (1976). Preserved for appeal at [R. 550-553].

ISSUE NO. 3
3rd ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED IN THE
PRESENCE OF THE JURY AND DURING THE TRIAL WHEN:
a. the lead Prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr. Walker
told him whether he had ever been convicted of a felony when
the prosecutor knew there had been no such conviction; [R.489,
p. 98,11. 14-16]
b. the Prosecutor argued the Defendant's conviction, permanent
injunction, and sentence to prison, to show that Lee Walker was
a bad person, and therefore, guilty of the crimes charged herein.
[R. 495, p.48,11. 23-25, p. 49,11. 1-3]
c. during closing argument, the lead Prosecutor told the Jury that
Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, had been sentenced to
prison; a fact not in evidence. [R. 495, p.48,49]
Information concerning those items had been admitted into
evidence for the sole purpose of establishing an element of securities fraud.
We review rulings on motions for a mistrial based on prosecutorial
misconduct for abuse of discretion. See State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah
Walker Brief

?oomm?-rA

Page 3 of 48

1993). Preserved Joi appeal ;il |K -low p 48,49] [R. 488 p.146]. [R. 489 p.
98,11.14-15]

ISSUE NO. 4
4th ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13 G DID NOT PROVIDE FOR
UNANIMITY ON AN ELEMENT OF

i

FRAUD AND THl
I )m' pmcess ch

V

URITIES
ro COMMIT ERROR.

- - i- '.niestions of law that we review applying a

correction of error standard. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818
P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 24, of the Utah Constitution.
Preserved for appeal at [R.544 540J [K .V>2 ((V II |

ISSUE NO #5
5 ra ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
THERE WAS ERROR IN THE METHOD USED IN SELECTING AND
SEATING THE JUR\ MM) Nil UTERNATI,.
There was error in the "disqualification" <>1
p 905 22 Ut 65 (1900) unlawful jury a nullity.

Walker Brief
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JMMH NO

<> State vBates 61

In the instant case, the Court arbitrarily removed Juror No. 6 and
substituted the alternate, who had been seated as Juror No. 9. [R.424] The
defendant voiced a timely and specific objection to this process.
On appeal, an appellant has the burden of establishing that reversible error
resulted from an abuse of discretion during the jury selection process. State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). Preserved for appeal at [R. 490, p.567,
568].

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL ITEMS
SEE ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402,

1-5-6-48

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(3)

1-5-6-48

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment

4 -5

Utah Constitution article I, sections 7 and 24

4-5-6.

Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[15 U.S.C. § 78 j (b)] Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]

6

UtahR. Crim. P. 17(h).

5-44

Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (0-

5-46

Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (t)

5-45.

UtahR. Crim. P. 18(d)

5-45

Utah R. Crim. P. 18(g)

4-5-46-47

Walker Brief
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Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 and <> I I JI (..!) (l>)(1953, as amended).

19

Utah <

5-6-7

VUJ ^ivi.), ^ amended).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 21, 1998, a jury found the Defendant guilty of Securities Fraud
and Money Laundering, both felonies.

J i i' W , the < 'ouri stayed

imposition of sentence and placed Defendant on 36 months supervised probation
with

I I he delendnnt would pn\ restitution of one hundred thousand

dollars ($100,000.00), jointly and severally, with all other defendants. Payment
wns placed in ibevanee pending trial and sentencing of co-defendants.
On August 31, 2000, the Defendant filed a MOTION t 0 "Fntei Con\ lei ion,
Pin siunl to IJCA 76-3-402, and to Terminate Probation," and requested the
Court reduce Defendant's convictions two degrees, pursuant lo I Hah ( ode Ann.
§ 76-3-402, and reset the amount of restitution at $5000.00.
The Court, after considering all ih< Milium,1111m available eloquently
expressed the desire to reduce the degree of offense by two degrees. The
Plaintifl did not ',enoii\l\ disagree but refused to consent to a reduction of more
than one degree. Plaintiffs consent is necessary to reduce a second degree
under Ihe movisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3).
Defendant's request for a finding of unconsdi ni lonahtv ofthai seelionol die
Utah code was favorably received by the Court, which was persuaded by
Arizona and California cases lli.il ihr < IUIII, ilsell, Ihnuigh Us t>wn resources,
researched and cited, which had held similar statutes to be unconstitutional.
Howevvi iin.ibk' tu find sinnlai precedents in Utah, the Court declined to hold
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3) is an unconstitutional violation of the
W a l k ' i Hiii'i'
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principle of separation of powers. Yet the Court encouraged Defendant to
appeal this issue to obtain a definitive decision..
Consequently, this Court declines to hold that Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-402 is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of
powers principle, but encourages Defendant to appeal this issue to
obtain a definitive decision. [R. 623]

FACTS OF THE CASE
Dr. Mark Sorenson, former owner of a wellness spa in Ivins, Utah, is the
investor and complainant in this case and afriendof Lance Hatch. David Orr,
also a Southern Utah Resident, is an investor, and afriendof Lance Hatch.
Lance Hatch is a former chiropractor, turned investment counselor, and David
Smith is an investment counselor from Florida. Steven Taggart is the Division
Director of Securities for the State of Utah. Bear Stearns operates the Bear
Stearns Securities Corp.'s Prime Broker Services, whose clients include hedge
funds, money managers, arbitrageurs, market makers, specialists, and other
professional investors trading at multiple securities firms. Fazia and Idsa are
people in New York who received, and gave a receipt for, $50,000.00 of
Sorenson's investment capital. Wallid Z. Suma is the client referred to in the
Memorandum of Understandings, (Exhibit #1 and Exhibit #2), who lives in
Southfield, Michigan, but hails from a foreign country. Lee Walker was a
practicing attorney in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Walker Brief
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Dr. Mark Sorenson, neighbor and home teacher to Lance Hatch, was
doing a home visit to Hatch's residence on a Sunday, on, or about, October 13
or 14th, 1994. Afterwards, in afriendlyconversation, Sorenson inquired of
Hatch what he had been doing since having left his chiropractic practice. Hatch
responded that he was studying to be a financial investor, or financial counselor.
In the course of this conversation, Hatch volunteered that he had come across
something that seemed very lucrative, which had the potential yield of a
$275,000.00 return on a $100,000.00 investment. That got Sorenson's interest.
Sorenson later stated, he did not think Hatch knew he had money to invest, and
responded with,"... hey, that sounds interesting, Lance, tell me more." [R. 489,
p. 49,11. 1-19].
Dr. Sorenson advised that his memory was sketchy, but he remembered
prime bank instruments being mentioned. Lance told him about a wealthy man,
named Wallid Summa, living in Michigan, but from a foreign country.
According to Hatch, Wallid Summa wanted to transfer one billion dollars into
Bear Stearns (sic) from an unknown point of origination, "...and he had sales, I
guess, for these instruments afterwards." [R. 489, p50,11. 16-25]
Sorenson's understanding was that, "...it could not be legally done unless
there was an account outside of Bear Stearns Company." He was told this by
Lance Hatch, who gave him his basic, overall understanding of the deal; at least,

Walker Brief
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that was his memory of what he was told at that time. [R. 489, p51,11. 1-25, p.
64,11. 24-25, p. 65,11. 1-25, p. 66,11. 1-25, p. 66,11. 1-25, p. 67,11. 1-23]
Hatch told him that the return would be very, very high, and that Hatch wished
he had the money to go into something like that, himself. At this point,
Sorenson said, "I've got some money to invest, can you tell me more, or get me
in touch with these people, and see if I can get in on this?" [R. 489, p.52,11. 4-7]
Sorenson next talked to either Lee Walker, or David Smith. His best
guess was that he talked to Walker, that same day, or the next day. [R. 489, p.
53,11. 12-13,23-25]. Lance Hatch got on one phone in his house and Sorenson
got on an extension phone. [R. 489, p. 54,11. 10-12] Lance Hatch dialed up a
phone number and they talked to someone on the other end who identified
himself as Lee Walker. [R. 489, p. 55,11. 1-4] Sorenson did not "...recall
talking too much about exactly how the investment was going to work." [R.
489, p. 55,11. 15-17]
The main substance of that conversation was Walker telling Sorenson that
Mr. Smith was a good guy and that Smith had done these things before. He
could vouch for Smith's credibility. [R. 489, p. 56,11. 16-18] [R. 489, p. 101,11.
9-15, p. 102,11. 2-6,19-25, p. 102,11. 1, p. 113,11. 1-11] Sorenson assumed an
understanding that things Walker was talking were about prime bank
instruments. [R 489, p. 56,11. 22-24] [R. 489, p. 102,11. 19-25, p. 102,11. 1]

Walker Brief
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This was the only conversation Snunsi'ii lu I v.illi \\ .ilki.i ullu:i l>y phone, or
in person. t k. itv, p. ^,,u. -*-uJ
Subsequently, Sorenson had conversations with Smith, by phone

)

gavu i.iii. -. • iT-•information about the investment, not all of whiw.
undersi

.,

T-

«3J [R. 489, p.107,11.10-20]
oianuuii

faxed to L;/.

Understanding, Lxlnbit # S l,was

*• !

. •••;: sorenson did not

remember the source of the second Memoranr

i . n

57,11. 17-20], nor did he know who faxed the first Memorandum v

« e

! Liu ii | K -189. p 58,11. 1-3] Sorenson had a limited discussion with Lance
me they read through the Memorandum; it looked good to them
iendous <•. A return. Lance did mention thai he had worked

:

with Lee Walker and that T (i, W.ill 11 w

u n li riiiuiate gin

llatchhad

been Walker's chiropractor and he said that Walkei had nlw:n . |i n<l In mi
time and such, and that he thought that Lee Walker was an "upright person
4K'J,|,.SN. II

Jl|
aoranaum ot Understanding, Sorenson transferred

$100,000.00, via \

; uorney trust account in Las

Vegas, Nevada |R 489 V- *S H 22 2* ~ *•>

Walker Brief
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\

Sorenson did not know, or remember, how he got the necessary
transmittal information for the transfer of funds into Walker's trust account. [R.
489, p. 59,11. 16-25] Lance Hatch had suggested the money be sent to Walker's
trust account".. .to hold his (Walker's) feet to the fire" for the purpose of
"...making sure that Lee was involved in the transaction." [R. 489, p. 60,11. 412] Sorenson did not receive acknowledgement from Lee Walker, at the time of
the wire transfer, but did receive acknowledgement, and a receipt, from Xavier
Fazio and David Freedman, of New York, for $50,000.00 of his investment.
[R.489,p. 61,11. 1-16]
When the scheduled payments did not come through, Sorenson contacted
David Smith, Lance Hatch, and tried to contact Lee Walker. His reasoned
choice to call Walker was that there was where he had sent the money. [R.489,
p. 63,11. 17-19]
Lance Hatch had known Walker for several years. They had met,
socially, and had done some things together, including a network marketing
company dealing in herbs and herbal remedies. [R. 488, p.221,11. 8-11, 18-22]
Lance Hatch testified that Lee Walker had introduced him to the Memorandum
of Understanding in October, 1994. [R.488, p. 215,11. 18-20, p.216,11. 10-11].
Walker faxed it to him [R. 488, p. 216,11. 16] and had advised that this was
something viable and could be shown to interested parties. [R. 488, 217,11. 22-

Walker Brief
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25] Walker indicated the Memorandum had come from David Smith, in Florida,
a client of his of 10 or 11 months, who, he thought, was honest and upright. [R.
488, p.218,11. 20-25]
Lance Hatch stated that he first discussed the Memorandum of
Understanding with Dr. Sorenson, at Lance Hatch's house, on a Sunday in
October 1994. [R. 488, p. 222,11. 5-10] They were discussing various things at
that time and Sorenson stated that he had money and was disappointed with the
return that he was making on his money. Hatch told him he had the Memoranda
that had been sent to him, if Sorenson wanted to look at it. [R. 488, p.223,11.
16-24] Hatch's testimony is confusing in that he stated that, after discussing
the memorandum with Sorenson, "We ... talked to Mr. Walker, who indicated
we could call Smith." [R. 488, p. 224,11. 8-24] He believed that only he and
Walker spoke at this time, and that, sometime later, a conference call occurred
between Sorenson, Hatch and Smith, and, he believed, Mr. Walker. [R.488, p.
225,11. 10-14] Hatch could not remember if Sorenson was in his home during
the conversation. [R. 488, p225,11. 15-25] Hatch said that there was an
urgency to get the money into these accounts and stated that both Smith and
Walker had conveyed that urgency to him. He blamed this urgency for
precluding any further checking into the validity of this investment. [R. 488, p.
226,11. 21-25, p. 227,11. 1-11]. Subsequently, Hatch recollected a three way

Walker Brief
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conversation with Sorenson and Walker, originating from his home, in October,
which was the only conversation with Walker before Sorenson invested his
funds. He said that they reviewed the Memorandum and discussed whether this
was a legal investment, and so forth. [R 488, p. 227,11. 12-25, p. 228,11. 1-17]
Hatch responds to the question on direct at [R. 488, p.229,11. 18-25, p. 230,11.
1-5]:
18 During this conversation what was
19 Mr. Walker's response to your inquiries?
20

A. Well, the gist of the response was once

21 again that he had known Mr. Smith for nearly a year
22 as a client and that in his opinion Mr. Smith was
23 upstanding and that this was probably a, a viable
24 situation. That this investment was okay. That
25 was the gist of it. You know, it went on. They
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R. 488]
1 were, they were long conversations.
2

Q. Were there— Did, did you have any

3 further conversations with Mr. Walker prior to
4 Dr. Sorenson investing?
5

A. I don't believe so.
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER
a portion of PAGE 230

Walker Brief
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PAGE 229

Hatch then stated that he suggested that Sorenson send the money to
Walker's attorney's trust account, which would put Walker in the position of
having to make sure that everything was handled correctly. [R. 488, p. 231,11.
1-17]. Hatch testified that he was not aware of Exhibit 6, a permanent
injunction against Lee Walker, enjoining him from engaging in any act, practice,
or courts of business which operates, or would operate, as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, in violation
of Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. § 78 j (b)]
and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5], there under. Nor was he aware of a
conviction of criminal contempt per Exhibit #7. Hatch testified that he would
certainly have thought it necessary to bring those items to Dr. Sorenson's
attention. [R. 488, p. 232,11. 17-25, p. 233, p. 234,11. 1-21] He denied any
knowledge of what had happened to Dr. Sorenson's money after he made the
initial investment. [R.488, p. 233,11. 23-25]
On cross examination, Hatch admitted that Walker did not tell him he had
any experience with Smith, involving Prime Bank Instruments, referred to in the
Memorandum of Understanding, and that he did recommend investments in
these Memorandum of Understanding as a good idea. [R. 488, p. 239,11. 8-25,
p. 24011.1-5]
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He testified about lengthy discussions he and Sorenson had had with
David Smith and that Smith's only reference to Walker was that he was his
attorney. He did not remember if he had said he was his attorney in connection
with this investment program. [488, p. 242-243,] Smith did not suggest, to
either Sorenson or Hatch, that the money be forwarded through Walker, but
indicated that he didn't care, so long as the money would wind up in the bank
accounts specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. [488, p. 244, 5-17]
He did not advise Walker that he had had Sorenson forward the money to him to
".. .put him (Walker) on the hook." He had been informed, by Walker, that the
nature of his (Walker's) research was solely his trust in David Smith. [R 488, p.
246,11. 20-25, p. 247,11. 1-12]
Steven Taggart, of the Utah Securities Commission, a witness for the
prosecution, testified that both the Legal Injunction, and the conviction for
contempt items, as referenced by exhibits 6 and 7, regarding the Defendant, Lee
Walker, would have to be disclosed by Walker, if he was recommending a
security to a potential investor. [R.488, p. 285-286]
The witness Herbert A Biera, a senior official at the Federal Reserve
Board in Washington, D.C. with the title of Associate Director in the Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation testified as an expert [R490, p.467-483]
and stated : "There's no such thing (prime bank instruments) and any use of
them would be illegitimate and fraudulent." [R. 490, p. 477,11. 21-23
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When Mr. Biern was given Exhibit #2 to examine and asked by the
prosecutor:
Q.

"In your opinion is the transaction that's described in that memorandum a

fraudulent transaction?"
A.

"Absolutely."

Q.

"Is it fair to say that that memorandum describes a fraud on its face?"

A.

"Absolutely"
[R490,p.478,11.8-15]
Joseph Matthew Jenkins, a certified public accountant and assistant

director at the Securities Division of Utah in charge of the licensing, auditing
and some investigatorial (sic) with the broker-dealers testified, as an expert in
accounting issues [488, p. 299- 318]and on the money trail of Dr. Sorenson's
One hundred thousand dollar ($100,000.00) investment.
He reviews wire transfers from Sorenson's Mountain America Credit
Union, bank records from Lee Walker's First Interstate Bank account, records
from Palm Beach National Bank account of David B. Smith records of Bear
Stearns regarding Mercantile Investments and sales invoices from Stewart G.
Eagle. In the course of his investigation he determined that on October 18, 1994
Mark Sorenson wired $100,000.00 to Lee Walkers trust account, which arrived
that same date, bringing the balance total of that account to 102,996.99.
That same day, pursuant to the accompanying instructions, $50,000.00
was wired to David B. Smith's account at Palm National Bank and then
$50,000.00 was wired to Bear Stearns for and on behalf of Mercantile
Investments. He was unable to determine what happened to the money that
went to Bear Stearns as there records were a "little bit" incomplete. [R. 490,
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p.301,11. 4-25, p. 302,11. 8-19]
The money that went to the Smith account mad the balance there to
balance to $50,000.00. On October 19th 1994 he purchased a Jeep for
$34,782.95, wrote a check to Sea Land Realty for a mortgage for $6500.00. On
that same day he received $2,050 in cash. There were other small amounts and
a bank charge.
His investigation developed that Lee Walker received no benefit from the
Sorenson funds, via the front door, or the back door. [R .490, p. 311,11. 10-20]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
ISSUE NO. 1
At sentencing the Defendant / Appellant moved for a double reduction of
sentence. The Court was favorably disposed to grant same but under Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-402(3) the Prosecuting Attorney is required to agree before granting
of the second reduction and declined to so do. Defendant / Appellant appeals
this as a conflict of the separation of powers inherent in the Utah Judicial
system. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402 is an unconstitutional violation of the
separation of powers principle.
ISSUE NO. 2

Defendant / Appellant was convicted of Securities Fraud having been
charged in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2) (b)
(1953, as amended). The evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove that
beyond a reasonable doubt in that it did not support the elements of the crime.
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ISSUE NO. 3

The lead prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr. Walker had told him
whether he had ever been convicted of a felony when the prosecutor knew there
had been no such conviction; argued the Defendant's previous conviction,
permanent injunction, and sentence to prison. Information concerning those
items had been admitted into evidence for the sole purpose of establishing an
element of securities fraud; [R.495, p.48,11. 23-25, p.49,11.1-3] and during
closing argument, the lead prosecutor told the Jury that Defendant / Appellant,
Lee Walker, had been sentenced to prison, a fact not in evidence. [R. 495, p49,
11. 2-3]
ISSUE NO. 4

Jury instruction no. 13 g did not provide for jury unanimity on an element
of the crime of securities fraud and thus invited the jury to commit error.

ISSUE NO. 5

There was error in the method used in selecting and seating the jury and the
alternate. There was error in the "disqualification" of juror no. 6. The Court
arbitrarily removed Juror No. 6 and substituted the Alternate Juror, who had
been seated as Juror No. 9. [R. 424]
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ARGUMENT OF ISSUES
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 1
REDUCTION OF CONVICTIONS Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(3)
In rendering the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, [R.619-625] Judge
G. Rand Beacham stated, on page 2 [R. 620], under the heading REDUCTION
OF CONVICTIONS:
At Defendant's sentencing hearing, this Court expressed its
findings as to Defendant's culpability in comparison with other
persons involved in the events which led to Defendant's
convictions. Considering the nature and circumstances of
Defendant's offenses, this Court still finds that Defendant has the
least culpability of any of those persons involved in the illegal
transactions, and still finds that Defendant received no profit, or
benefit, from the illegal transactions. The only co-defendant who
was charged in this jurisdiction, David Smith, has never reached the
trial of his charges, even though his alleged culpability is much
greater than Defendant's; after several delays due to changes in
Smith's legal counsel, the trial scheduled earlier this month was
again continued due to the hospitalization of Smith's appointed
attorney. Consequently, Defendant has been convicted and has
served nearly two years of probation, while his co-defendant still
awaits trial. This Court also finds that Defendant's history and
character, though not as spotless as might be hoped, are such that
[R. 620] his motion should be seriously considered. Having
considered all the information available, this Court concludes that it
would be unduly harsh to record Defendant's convictions for the
degree of offense established by statute. To this extent, Plaintiff
does not seriously disagree.
Plaintiff refuses to consent to a reduction of more than one
degree, however. Plaintiffs consent is necessary for a reduction of
Defendant's offenses to misdemeanors, under the provisions of
Walker Brief
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Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(3), which pmv ides an offense may be
reduced only one degree under this section, unless the prosecutor
specifically agrees in writing, or on the court record, that the
offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be
reduced, under this section, by more than two degrees.
Defendant asks this Court to find that this statute violates the
constitutional principle of separation of powers, by allowing the
prosecutor, who serves in the executive branch of government, to
control a judicial decision about sentencing. This argument has a
superficial appeal, because this Court would, in fact, order the
reduction of Defendant's convictions to class a misdemeanors, but
for the prosecutor's refusal to consent. Defendant provided the
Court with only a cursory argument in support of his motion,
however, and cited no specific precedent. Plaintiff simply argued
that the statute should be respected, but has cited only noncontrolling precedents on somewhat related issues.
Upon consideration of Defendant's motion, this Court
assigned its law clerk to research the issue. There appears to be no
controlling precedent in this State, but the law clerk has identified
several decisions, from sister states, which bear on the issue. In the
view of this Court, the best reasoning comes from Arizona and
California, which have both held that a statute, which requires the
prosecutor's assent before an offense is reduced, does violate the
separation of powers doctrine. In [R621] State v. Jones 689 P. 2d
561 (Ariz. App. 1984), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the
Legislature
cannot give the prosecuting attorney, after a
conviction, [the power] to decide what the
punishment shall be. That is a judicial function.
[Arizona statute] was enacted to mitigate the
punishment prescribed by §28-692.01(B) and
the decision to mitigate a sentence properly
belongs to the judge and not to the prosecutor.
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Further, in State v. Prentiss 786 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1989), the
Arizona Supreme Court upheld Jones, stating that Jones made it
clear that it is unconstitutional to limit a judge's ability to impose a
mitigated sentence to instances in which the prosecutor makes a
post-trial "recommendation." They stated: "The cornerstone upon
which Jones is predicated is that the legislature cannot, through an
executive agent, restrict the judiciary from deciding what a
sentence should be." Id. at 935.
The Arizona court recognized that a prosecutor has complete
discretion in deciding what charge to bring, but held that "once the
legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing
discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of
discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that
discretion." See also, State v. Dykes 789 P.2d 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990) (requiring motion by prosecutor, before judge could apply
lesser sentence, unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers
doctrine).
In California, the courts have mainly focused on the fact that,
although prosecutors have discretion to determine what crime to
charge, that is the extent of their discretion. They do not hold the
same power after a conviction has been obtained. In People v.
Tenorio 473 P.2d 993, 3 Cal.3d 89 (Cal. 1970), the California
Supreme Court addressed a statutory provision which gave the
district attorney the power to preclude a trial court from exercising
its discretion to strike a prior offense for [R. 622] the purposes of
sentencing. In that setting, in which the district attorney's "veto"
power was exercised at the sentencing phase, well after the filing of
the charges, the court concluded that such an exercise violated the
separation of powers doctrine. The court explained:
The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who
believes that a charge should be dismissed in the
interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to
dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must
bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must
be independent, and a Judge should never be required
to pay for its exercise.
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Tenorio 3 Cal.3d at 94. See also, Esteybar v. Municipal
Court 485 P.2d 1140, 5 Cal. 3d 119 (Cal. 1971); Davis v. Municipal
C 757 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1988) (following Tenorio and Esteybar);
People v. Superior Court 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974) (striking down
statute giving prosecutor veto power over trial court's decision to
sentence defendant to diversion program).
This Court finds the reasoning in the Arizona and California
cases to be very sound and persuasive. There is no similar
precedent in Utah, however. Furthermore, the state of the principle
of separation of powers in Utah is, to this Court, impossible to
assess. The competing decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in In re
Inquiry Concerning a Judge 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998) and In re
Inquiry Concerning a Judge 1999 UT 6, 976 P.2d 581 have left this
Court with serious doubt as to the viability of the separation of
powers principle. Finally, decisions as to the constitutionality of
statutes are generally appropriate and meaningful only in the
appellate courts.
Consequently, this Court declines to hold that Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-402 is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of
powers principle, but encourages Defendant to «npeal this issue to
obtain a definitive decision. [R. 623]

Conference on Judicial Independence and Accountability
Judicial independence and accountability are two principles essential to
our system of governmeiil

1'U |ni'U. iplo air under^om^, examination and

challenge after two centuries of quiet acceptance. The following materials were
principally gathered at the University of Southern California Conference on
Judicial Independence and Accountability held November 20-21. 1998.
I. Institutional independence is not the same as decisional independence.
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The organization of the judiciary and its relationships to the other
branches of government are its structural features. Structural independence may,
but does not necessarily, affect the decisional independence of judges. We often
speak of independence generally, while the concern is for decisional
independence. As a judge considers an individual case, decisional independence
enables full and complete neutrality. This appears to be more a function of the
judge and her approach rather than depending upon structural realities.
1. Judicial independence and accountability protect the Rule of Law.
The Rule of Law is the foundation of an ordered society. If the judiciary is
subject to immediate control by the king, legislature or populace,
decisions may be made in response to that pressure rather than according
to the Rule of Law. On the other hand, an ungoverned judiciary may
depart from the Rule of Law without fear of consequence. Independence
and accountability protect the Rule of Law.
No Branch of Government May Have Unlimited Power
Madison argued in Federalist 47 that "the accumulation of all powers
legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one a few or
the many . . . may justly be called the very definition of tyranny." John Ferejohn,
Dynamics ofJudicial Independence: Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary,
Page 9.
The Concept of "Constitutionality" Requires an Independent Judiciary
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The need for judicial independence arises in a constitutional government
where only those laws that are constitutionally legitimate ought to be enforced.
Courts must be able to do much of the work in deciding which laws survive this
test. A/at 14.
What Incursions on Judicial Independence Matter?
The threats to judicial independence, in order to be real, must:
1. have reason to get a judge or court to reach a decision on grounds
irrelevant to law;
2. have sufficient resources - political, social and/or economic
influence or intimidate the judge;
3. be capable of forming a will or intention to act in way that
interferes with judicial independence. Id at 18
Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court review this
issue and consider how it pertains to the principle of the separation of powers in
the Utah Judiciary.
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 2
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE GUILT
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Defendant / Appellant was convicted of Securities Fraud having been
charged in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2) (b)
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(1953, as amended). The evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that:
a. the Defendant / Appellant made statements, or failed to disclose, in
connection with an offering of a security;
b. that the Defendant / Appellant knew of the fraudulent nature of
the investment plan when he talked to Mr. Sorenson, or when he
wire transferred the investment money.
See State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 2000.UT.0042150 f 18.
To determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to convict a defendant, we do not examine
whether we believe that the evidence at trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather,
we will conclude that the evidence was insufficient
when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences
drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive, or
inherently improbable, that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he, or she, was
convicted." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah
1993).
In State v Larsen, 865 P. 2d 1355 (Utah 1993), the Court held that a
person violated § 61—1—(2) only if that person acts "willfully." Id at 1358.
Furthermore, UCA 61-1-21 specifies "willfulness" as the culpable state of
mind. The trial transcript reveals that Mr. Walker did not willfully violate the
law. Defendant's / Appellant's only representation was that he knew Smith and
believed him to be credible. [R. 489, p. 102, p. 103,11. 1-14, p. 113,11. 1-22]
Defendant's / Appellant's omission to reveal a prior securities conviction was
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immaterial, because his involvement was not of a nature that created a duty to so
divulge. It is "inherently improbable' that, on the basis of a single preinvestment phone call, lastingfromfiveto eight minutes, between Defendant /
Appellant and Sorenson, the elements of a public offense are proven to exist
beyond reasonable doubt. [R. 489, p. 113,11. 1-22]
In Fibro Trust, Inc. v Brahman Financial Inc., 91A P. 2d 288,199 UT 13,
362 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah 2/12/99), the Court followed the same line of
reasoning as in the Larson case and came to the conclusion that proof of a
violation of either sections 61-1-1 (3), or 61-1-1 (1), also requires proof that
the person willfully engaged in the prohibited conduct. Applying the "willful"
mental state to prohibited conduct should amount to a requirement that there be
some evidence of a deliberate, purposeful act, which is distinguishable from
behavior which is accidental or inadvertent.
Matters involving securities law are often times very complicated and
difficult for jurors to understand. There was, in this trial, considerable testimony
about the nature of the investment; i.e. "Prime Bank Note case". That
testimony was given by the State's expert witnesses to the effect that "Prime
Bank Notes" simply didn't exist and were fraudulent vehicles. [R.490, p. 477,11.
21-23] That sort of testimony was not directed at Defendant / Appellant, but
had to do with the investment vehicle itself. Nevertheless, the substance of the
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testimony was likely confusing and of such a nature that a juror could reach the
errant conclusion and assume Defendant / Appellant's culpability. The notion of
reasonable doubt could become very, very clouded in a juror's mind.
Include in that mixture the significant prejudice, created by statements to
the jury, by the lead prosecutor, and the concept of reasonable doubt goes up in
smoke.
For example, during trial, the prosecutor improperly brought matters before
the jury that had the sole effect of arousing undue prejudice against the
Defendant, to wit:
At trial, the lead prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr. Walker had
told him whether he had ever been convicted of a felony. The prosecutor asked
that question knowing Mr. Walker had not been convicted of a felony. [R. 489,
p. 98.11. 14-16]
a. The prosecutor argued the Defendant's conviction, the permanent
injunction, and the sentence to prison, to show that Lee Walker was a bad
person, and therefore, guilty of the crimes charged herein when those
items had been admitted into evidence for the sole purpose of establishing
an element of securities fraud. [R. 495, p. 48,11. 23-25, p. 49,11. 1-3]
b. During closing argument, the lead prosecutor told the jury that the
Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, had been sentenced to prison. [R.
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495, p.48,49] That fact was not in evidence and was unduly prejudicial
against Defendant / Appellant.
These statements, by the Prosecutor, denied Defendant / Appellant, Lee
Walker, a fair trial and due process of law.
It is fundamental, in our law, that a person may be
convicted criminally only for his acts; not for his
general character. That principle is violated if a
conviction is based on an inference that conviction is
justified because of the defendant's criminal character,
or propensity to commit bad acts. The admission of
evidence of prior crimes may have such a powerful
tendency to mislead thefinderof fact as to subvert the
constitutional principle that a defendant may be
convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a
specific crime charged. State v. Saunders 992 P.2d 951
(Utah, 1999) (emphasis added).
Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, was also convicted of Money
Laundering, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1953, as amended).
§ 76-10-1903 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
76-10-1903. Money laundering.
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering who:
(a) transports, receives, or acquires the property, which is in fact
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, knowing that the property
involved represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity;
(b) makes proceeds of unlawful activity available to another by
transaction, or transportation, or other means, knowing that it is intended
to be used for the purpose of continuing, or furthering, the commission of
specified unlawful activity;
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(c) conducts a transaction knowing that property involved in the
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with
the intent:
(i) to promote the unlawful activity;
(ii) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source,
ownership, or control of the property;
(iii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this
chapter.
(d) knowingly accepts or receives property which is represented to
be proceeds of unlawful activity, (emphasis added)
The trial transcript reflects, unequivocally, that Mr. Walker was forced
into a surety situation without his knowledge, or consent, by the victim himself.
[R. 489, p. 105, 106,11. 1] Furthermore, at the time the victim transferred funds
into Mr. Walker's trust account, he (Mr. Walker) had no idea of the fraudulent
nature of the investment.
In United States v. Korolkov 870 F. Supp. 60, the Court said that "the
elements and nature of the crime" are not satisfied where funds simply pass
through a city in the course of a wire transfer. None of the elements of wire
fraud "is alleged to have occurred in [a] district where defendants are not alleged
to have "transmitted anything, or caused the transmission, from [that district]",
and where the district in question is not the "place of initiating [the wire]
transmission."
More significantly, the case of United States v. Bezmalinovic 962 F. Supp.
435, where funds passed through an interim bank, the Court said: "The crediting
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and debiting that occurred in the Manhattan were purely ministerial acts that did
not involve any decision making". (Emphasis added)
According to the testimony at trial, it was someone other than Mr. Walker
who directed that funds pass through his account and, upon learning that funds
were deposited, Mr. Walker's act was simply to transfer them out, as instructed
by the victim. [R. Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2]
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Lee Walker acted as
anything other than an innocent grantor of an individual personal reference;
certainly no evidence incriminating him as the originator of the
"Memorandum(s) of Understanding". [R.489 p.55 11. 10 -25, p.5611. 1-18]
Only Hatch's statement that walker faxed it to him. There is no evidence
showing that he acted as a prognosticator for whatever investments transpired in
this case.
In the five to eight minute phone conversation, the sole communication
between Walker, Sorenson and Hatch, Walker was not the subject of the verbal
exchange, nor was the "Memorandum", nor the transaction outlined or proposed
therein. Rather, David Smith was the sole subject of that conversation. In that
conversation, Walker merely served as a character reference for David Smith, a
person whom he'd come to respect through his admitted limited
acquaintanceship. [R.489 p.56 11. 25, p.57 11.1-6; p. p. 102,103,11. 1-14,109,11.
18-24, p. 112,11. 9-25, p. 113,11. 1-22.] [R. 488p.l57 11. 12-15; p. 174 11. 6-25,
p.175 11.1-6; p.204 11. 24-25, p. 205 11. 1-5; p.20811.1-21; p.209 11. 21-25,
p.21011. 3] This reference was not given in a formal, or business context, but in
a loose, casual, social capacity. It may be important to note that Walker never
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received any personal remuneration for his reference, nor could he have known
that he could be considered to be acting in any official capacity.
A country club membership would have required far more information
than was solicited from Walker. In fact, Sorenson's memory that Hatch had
spoken of Walker as a good sort of fellow, who "paid his chiropractic bills on
time", - says it all. Especially when that was all it took, in Sorenson's words, to
make it a sweet, safe, deal. The real responsibility for the weight of Sorenson's
reference rests completely between Lance Hatch and Dr. Sorenson.
During that singular phone conversation, Walker could have had no
foreknowledge that his account would later be used for the transfer of funds. It
was Hatch's idea to use his account to "...keep the pressure on him (Walker),"
by Hatch's own later words, to make sure things went right At that time,
Walker was not a player in the transaction between Sorenson, Hatch, and David
Smith, nor did he ever truly become one. The record does not provide evidence
that Walker ever profited, benefited, or schemed to profit, from the transaction.
Only his trust account, acting in a passive manner, as in that of a temporary
repository, could be construed as a point of evolution upon the money trail.
Walker never gave his account number to Sorenson for the transfer of funds
therein, and he only transferred funds therefrom at Sorenson's behest.
By Sorenson's own,finaltestimony, Lee Walker's representation to him
was limited to Walker's experience as an acquaintance and attorney of David
Smith. Therefore, Walker had no more duty to disclose, volunteer, or divulge
personal information about himself than if he'd participated in a conversation
with telemarketers. No attorney / client relationship ever existed between
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Sorenson and Walker. The only client relationship existing was that between
Lance Hatch, prime promulgator, and Dr. Sorenson; and that was an investment
advisor / investor relationship. Therefore, no unlawful acts, in the context of
Utah Code, relating to investment advisory and fraud, were committed by Lee
Walker. Walker isn't shown to have had any interest in whether that security
was sold or not. He didn't contrive it, he didn't offer it, he didn't sign it, and he
didn't engage Hatch to go sell it, for his own interests, according to the
testimony in this case. There's no evidence at all that he authorized Hatch to do
anything.
Dr. Sorenson, under cross-examination by Mr. Scarth, [beginning R.489,
p. 101,11.1], makes it clear that the singular subject of his only conversation, an
five to eight minute phone conversation, was David Smith and Smith's
credibility. [R. 489, p. 102,11. 1-15, p. 103,11. 1-14, p. 113,11. 1-22]
Dr. Sorenson further testifies that he had always assumed that Lee Walker
never got a penny of his money and that Walker's trust account was never more
than a mere stopover point for his money on its way to its destination, as
designated in the Memorandums of Understanding. [R. 489, p. 103,11. 15-25,
p.104,11. 1-25, p.105,11. 1-25, p. 106,11. 1-5]
Dr. Sorenson goes on to expose his lack of specific memory, as to who
represented what, in contradiction of his earlier testimony. [R. 489, p. 106,11.6-
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25, p. 107,11. 1-25, p. 108,11. 1-15] Despite lack of memory, he admits Lee
Walker was never a source of information on the investment.
Again, contradicting prior testimony, Dr. Sorenson admits that Lee
Walker's conversation with him brought no weight to bear on his decision to
invest. Rather, it was his conversation with David Smith that did so. [R. 489, p.
109,11. 18-24, p.l 12,11. 9-25]
Sorenson's testimony inevitably shows that he'd seen proof that Walker
had only forwarded funds from his trust account, exactly as the Memorandum of
Understand had prescribed, exactly as Dr. Sorenson had desired. Sorenson
indicates that he knew that Walker's limited participation in the travel of the
money had not ever been necessary, but that Walker had been brought into this
facet of the deal at Lance Hatch's urging, motivated by the desire to keep as
many people involved, and therefore responsible, as possible. [R. 489, p. 116,
11. 14-25, p. 117,11. 1-25, p. 118,11.1-25, p. 119,11. 1-14] This all raises the
question, in this transaction, can Lee Walker be considered anything other than
just another victim?
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 3
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED IN THE
PRESENCE OF THE JURY AND DURING THE TRIAL WHEN:
a. the lead prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr.
Walker had told him whether he had ever been convicted of a
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felony when the prosecutor knew there had been no
conviction;
b. the prosecutor argued the Defendant's previous conviction,
permanent injunction, and sentence to prison, to show that
Lee Walker was a bad person, and therefore, guilty of the
crimes charged herein; information concerning those items
had been admitted into evidence for the sole purpose of
establishing an element of securities fraud; [R.495, p.48,11.
23-25, p.49,11.1-3]
c. during closing argument, the lead prosecutor told the Jury
that Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, had been sentenced
to prison, a fact not in evidence. [R. 495, p49,11. 2-3]
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R. 489] starting at page

PAGE 91

(Judge G. Rand Beacham, speaking regarding questions of witnesses
which introduced Defendants criminal background by prosecutor.)
1

question is what was it and then we go on to the

2

other questions.

3

It is prejudicial.

I don f t think it's so

4

prejudicial that that outweighs the probative value

5

because it relates to an element.

6

are a couple of limits that need to be placed on it

7

though, however, at this point.

8

considering that we are early on in the evidence

9

the questioning can be did the defendant say

I think there

First of all,

10

whether he had ever had any difficulty with the

11

Securities and Exchange Commission or something
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12

alpng those lines.

Did the defendant say whether

13

he had ever been convicted of an offense of this

14

nature.

15

expect will be in the negative.

16

think it would be allowing the prosecution to

17

testify if the questions were did, did the

18

defendant state that he was convicted of this

19

specific offense in this court on this date.

20

other words, those are things that weren't

21

disclosed.

22

testimony that this witness needs to get out is he

23

wasn't told anything about the subject, period.

24

The evidence, direct evidence to show that those

25

facts existed can come in later through other

The answers, the witness's answers we
At this point I

In

And so the fact that this, the

PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R.489]
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1

means.

2

should be limited to did the defendant say whether

3

rather than did the defendant say that.

4

But at this point I think the questioning

In addition, I will give limiting

5

instructions on at least a couple of things and

6

perhaps another if, if I can get a chance to look

7

at some of your authorities on the reliance issues

8

and I'll let you know on that.

PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER

[R. 489]
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1

but that's, that's what we were talking about this

2

morning is to have this duty instruction.

3

THE JUDGE:

Right.

Right.

Okay.

4

Let's see if we can get that covered then.

5

question then about what I've decided on that?

Walker Brief
" 1 A A 1 A A 1 ~% i^ A

Page 35 of 48

Any

6

M R . BARBER:

So if I u n d e r s t a n d

it: t h e

7

f o r m o f t h e q u e s t i o n w]11 b e d i d h e t e l l y o u

8

anything

•9

as I

i » I1«• t 11< • j

T H E JUDGE:

h e 11.M 1 .

Rjght,

- that, i s that

s o m e t h i n g y o u c a n deal with, M r
I IR

VIA Y! IENT

I. I 1 .1 i 1 J

THE J t JDGE:
PENNY C . A B B O T T ,

Okay.

COURT REPORTER

Wayment?

| 1<"

.£ i

A l l right:.

4H'i|

PAGE 9 4

8
9

conversations

w: ' : : . :

on*- <":onversation

.

rtd-M\

ut-^s you nad

v our c o n v e r s a t i c : . wi t h
* merit a i a

M.

Mike:

sa^ whutiit.

MR
hii

1 6

hii i d

< "f r

'

II ;
18

..t L : *.j .i L'.-en in

• i(\

WAYMENT:
hei i

Hi •' I >

Wa 1** • say whether
.

"III WTTTIKS"

Hi i .

M;

Objection,

ICARIH;

prison?

el«

.

Your Honor.

May

we approarr,'

]9

THE • JUDGE:

20

( S i d€

211

MP

Okay.

Ba i: d:i s cus,
SCARTH:

:

"<:: J 3 c \ ;: s i )

That's a misdemeanor

22

convic11on ar ; * < * • impJ ying through his question

23

t : t h e j I i r ;y t:

24

felony ,
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of a

25

THE JUDGE:

Well, the evidence will be

PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R.489]
1

what it is.

2

that way.

I agree it's unfortunate it was asked

3

MR. SCARTH
SCARTH:

4

for a mistrial if t;

5

that question.

6
7

PAGE

THE JUDGE:

Well, for the record I move

I think he already did,

didn't he?

8

MR. SCARTH

I think h e —

9

THE JUDGE:

I think he did.

10

MR. SCARTH

It is for the record but I

THE JUDGE:

I understand.

11

so move.

12
21

Maybe he did.

(End of side bar discussion)
22

MR. SCARTH:

I would like to state that

23

the question assumed facts not in evidence, Your

24

Honor.

25

client being convicted of a felony.

The question being was he informed of my
There's no

PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R.489]
1
2

PAGE

evidence before the Court of that.
THE JUDGE:

Well the question was--

3

That's correct.

The question was whether there

4

was anything disclosed of that nature.

5

no evidence whether there was anything of that

6

nature to disclose at this point.

7

MR. SCARTH:

8

MR. WAYMENT:

9

Walker Brief
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]0

crime of any kind?

1]

T H E WITNESS;

N o , he cij ci n o t .

]2

MR. WAYMEN n

""

13

indicate one way oi * ».»*

3I

been the subject r£

THE WITNESS:

]6

)

1

20

..:

• t: 1 HE had ever

No.

" *

/hat 'i I'IE re

about the expei Ltisa .. ',nt_ t i-opleilkf-r L<-1.

]'

*

J j-ermanent ; ri j -nction?

15

II 1

• H Mr. Walker

"' 1

What w

.- i ^lcie y-i. invested about the

-perience ot t* ^ ;

, e nanai i.ng your money in

this investment ?

PENNY C. A B B O T T , COURT REPORTER [R.4 89]

PAGE 98

At hand is the matter of how a question was asked of the witness, by the

in in III i rmation about his earlier misadventures in the presentation, or
repre

••

w ei e take

'fe framing w questions by
dif foi

:

to tli s Defendant's deti ime nt

=: ci it oi ' I his occurred numerous times, in
te d to. ' \ hen Sorenson was asked if

\A aitker had e v er told him that he (Walker) had been convicted of a fcloi i> : a
completely misleading question, as Walker had never been convicted — -•*

c ef!cv» v\lk-i IK deenk ' *\>^ HVM . u ions :i the \\a\ it was p o ^ 1

^ (Utah 19c>2)(re

i y " iilikiii i i n i ' f

;ecl where tne prosecutors remau *

Pago IKoi -IK

considering in reaching a verdict and the remarks were harmful). Also see State
v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997).
That assessment, by the judge, fully indicted the error, and should have
obligated the Court to grant a mistrial. [R. 489 p.98 11. 3-12]
But, more importantly, the question remains of whether Walker ever had
any duty to disclose, at all, in any form. By the prosecutor's own words, and
Sorenson's testimony, there was only ever one conversation between Walker
and Sorenson; a phone conversation. [R. 489 p.94 11. 8-13] The sole subject of
that conversation was not the consideration of any kind of securities, or any
kind of deal. Rather, that subject matter was limited to Walker's experience
with David Smith. Nor was this a formal endorsement of Smith's character, but
a simple reference based upon social dealings and common knowledge.
Consequently, there was truly no duty, on the part of Walker, to disclose any
kind of personal information, because neither he, nor the transaction, was ever
the subject of the conversation. Emmett infra.
In fact, it was Lance Hatch who had busied himself with representations
regarding the deal, and it was Lance Hatch who had a duty to disclose anything
about himself.
Therefore, the matter at hand is not merely of how the question was asked
of the witness, but should it have been asked at all. The question, in any form, is
based upon the false premise that Walker was representing securities, which he
was not, and therefore, had no such a duty to disclose. Short of being a felon,
which he was not, Walker had no obligation to bare his history, or his soul; none
whatsoever. The Court, however, had a duty to right, or at to least attempt to
reverse, the wrongs imposed upon Walker by the prosecutor's misconduct.
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ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 4
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13 G DID NOT PROVIDE FOR JURY
UNANIMITY ON AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF SECURITIES
FRAUD AND THUS INVITED THE JURY TO COMMM ERRUR.
T^^±*~.,^+

*3Gisprot

1"

i ou are instructed that, while a number of
representations and omissions are alleged as the basis
for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent
upon the state to prove each and every one of them. It
is enough that the state prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a false statement, or material omission, was
made in connection with the offer or sale of the
security.
Tlieix %a- no safeguard in the inannei in uhich the iurv was instructed to
L

i
- eonstnuie

^ enmmal violatu ^

' V * *sentation(>», ox
«n> uu.-. > , M*can^ more than

iprcruv:v<> ^-:» the defendant has *

m o-tosiion.

a J> a requirement of subsume.u agreement as to the piinupal latliial
'* underlying a specified offense. I TnitedStates v. Duncan, 850 h 2d
110*
1987); I *?:/.

(npson \ ^ 1^ 2d 45* 4 ^ 4 ^ * L A 5 197'
manimo

•

i \

*edj\\i .M* en*v?W discarded,

bi it it does require unanimous agieeineni as to ihe nature of ilk uwicnu^n •
vimilrilion, n .n simpls the fact that a violation has occurred.
In State v. Russel, 733 P,2d 162 (Utah 1987), the Ulali Supreme Court affirmed
:i second-degiee inuidei ion /ii/lion, alllu 11;.»II Ihe Inal eourl had refused to
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instruct the jury that there must be unanimous agreement on which of three
alternative mens rea the defendant possessed; i.e., intent to kill, intent to cause
serious bodily injury, or "depraved indifference". State v. Dykes 789 P.2d
1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
In the instant case, we are concerned with the breach, or what the
defendant did which constituted the breach; the jury is not disagreeing on which
alternate mens rea the defendant possessed. Rather, the jury was allowed to
disagree on what Mr. Walker did, or did not do, and still find him guilty.
The rule set out in Russel has application only where a statute provides
various modes by which a specific wrong may be accomplished. See generally,
Annotation: Jury Unanimity-Mode of Offense, 75 A.L.R.4th 91. It does not
apply where the prosecution relies on alternative "wrongs" to prove a single
offense, or a single element, of an offense. See Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d
188 (Cob. 1991); Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1985).
Consider Justice Stewart's observations in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987, 585-88 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting), Id. at 591 (Zimmerman,
J., concurring and dissenting); Id. at 5 77-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result).
The importance of preserving the principle of jury unanimity, as to all
"elements of offense", can hardly be overstated. To dilute that principle by
allowing jurors to disagree among themselves as to separate, alternative
elements of the crime, even though they agree on the general conclusion that the
crime has, in fact, been committed, is to lose the value of the synergistic effect
of jurors acting as a group in reconstructing the facts and applying the law.
Non-unanimity permits a jury to refrain from coming to grips with determining
Walker Brief
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.... .:. d.s that del

s of the crime.

unanimity, as to alternative elements of a crime, can a.s,. vk ,a \ v-e a
defendant o* - • v??nse to the charge

A. defendant urges a defense that i^ \ aiid
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.

Finally, if the principle of jury unanimity is ,
ii, 1ii\ed, all the vaunted protections of proof, beyond a

reasonable doubt, will be threatened Requiring jury
unanimity, as to the crime itself only, rather than each
element of the crime, would permit a jury to render
inconsistent, and potentially irrational, verdicts
because they may be based on conflicting, and even
inconsistent, determinations of the facts. That is no
small erosion of a fundamental principle of our
criminal justice system. Id. at 578. State v. Saundeis.
slip op. No. 950295 (Utah June 11, 1999) Instruction
informing jury that "there is no requirement that the
jurors be unanimous about precisely which act
occurred, or when or where the act or acts occurred",
was plain and harmful error.
tu v. ientiL\\, 913 p # 2d 7:H- »
* inanimity is necessary as tr .-M
• sotirig State v. Saundet - 7

1995) State v. Russell, 733 P.^d 162
) (although all elements of a crime must be
•ush. this does not mean that the jury
i mi a single view of the transaction if a
conclusion ma* he justified upon either of two
i>11 lie evidence; verdict cannot be
i/v showing that jury split on the
M r+K
_.*MIS
stati ite i inder which the •
7
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. .

defendant is convicted actually defines more than one
crime, and not merely one crime which may be
committed in several different ways, the defendant is
entitled to jury unanimity on which crime he is guilty
of committing."
With no unanimity instruction, a real recipe for judicial mischief stands
poised to contaminate the judicial process. The jury is likely to reach a guilty
verdict based upon a conglomeration of divergent opinions as to the nature of
the defendant's guilt.
For instance, in the instant case, one juror might have felt Walker was
guilty of ignorance, by his having vested his trust in David Smith. A second
juror might have found Walker guilty of cavalier management of his trust
account. A third might have assumed his guilt due to misstatements by the
prosecutor to effect that Walker was a convicted felon. Taken to the extreme,
still another juror, based upon his reaction to Walker's appearance, might reach
a certainty of Walker's guilt simply because, to him, Walker had the look and
attitude of a philanderer.
A equals a; guilt is guilt. Come the vote, a guilty verdict is reached upon
the wave of a single, slender tliread of unanimity; they all agree that they believe
Walker is guilty of something. But, if asked, they just could not agree upon
what.
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 5
THERE WAS ERROR IN THE METHOD USED IN SELECTING AND
SEATING THE JURY AND THE ALTERNATE.
There was error in the "disqualification" of juror no. 6.
Trial courts are responsible for safeguarding a defendant's constitutional
right to an impartial jury. Stale v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440,442 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). A defendant has the right to have voir dire
questions posed which will "assist counsel in the intelligent use of peremptory
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The Defendant does not suggest that the Court acted with improper
motive in "disqualifying" Juror No. 6. However, the removal of the juror was
improper, even if strictly random. The parties are entitled to the verdict of the
jury they jointly selected. The rules deny the Court any right, or power, to
arbitrarily, or randomly, skew the selection process. The Court's selection and
"disqualification" of Juror No. 6 was in error and in contradiction to due process
of law.
The jury is seated before it hears one word of testimony or argument,
indeed, before it hears the language of the formal accusation. To allow a Court
the power to "peremptorily" remove a member of the panel, after observing him
or her throughout the trial, would create a significant potential for abuse.
In selecting an eight-member jury in criminal proceedings, the state and
the Defendant are each entitled to peremptorily strike four qualified veniremen.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d). Sixteen veniremen are qualified and pass for cause
before the first peremptory challenge is made. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (t).
This means that all those who ultimately serve on the jury are identified when
the first peremptory is spent.
Typically, there are one or more members of the qualified panel with
whom neither party is particularly "comfortable" and who both parties have
earmarked to be stricken. Although it is usually quite obvious who these
veniremen are, experienced counsel will not use an early challenge to strike one
of them, hoping that opposing counsel will spend one of his peremptories in
eliminating the "unattractive" panel member. This is a waiting game which the
state's prosecutor will ordinarily lose because the challenges are made
alternatively; the state exercises the first challenge, and the defendant enjoys the
Walker Brief
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its verdict in error. By the sheer volume of earlier testimony, from different
sources, as to Lee Walker's culpability, one can hardly fault the jury for the
dominating weight it gave to that negative testimony. To be hammered,
consistently, with such negative information overload, only to overlook what
constituted its reversal, as reflected in the few pages of Mr. Scarth's crossexamination of Dr. Sorenson, would create error. And that is human.
One must also take into account the false premise of Walker's alleged
representation of securities, as offered by the State, without v/hich, there was no
duty, by Walker, to disclose any past information about himself.
Then, the prosecutorial misconduct in portraying Walker as a convicted
felon must be taken into consideration. The jury had to assume Walker's guilt
by that misinformation alone.
Additionally, without a unanimity instruction, the stage was set for a
guilty verdict resulting from the confusion accruing from all the factors above.
As mentioned, the jury, through simple human nature, had to be convinced that
Walker had to be guilty of something. On that part at least, they were obviously
unanimous.
In reviewing the record and matters covered in Issues No. 2 and 3, one
can see that Dr. Sorenson's testimony brings into question Lee Walker's
participation in anything more than a character referral during the single phone
conversation he had with Dr. Sorenson. There is no evidence that Lee Walker
was representing any security, or any kind of deal; this renders the matter of his
alleged failure to disclose completely moot. The Defense, therefore, prays that
this Court reverse thefindingsof the lower Court and dismiss the charges
against Lee Walker.
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United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
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__ _

Utah Constitution article I, sections 7 and 2-1
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
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'
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(f).
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Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (t)
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Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d)
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Utah R. Crim. P. 18(g)

4-5-4<> 47

amended).

J

1

5-6-7

n

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at
the trial with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may
consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment
entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been
present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good
cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous
conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following
order:
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a
jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution.

2

(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant
makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders
otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as
specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.
(0 In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made
orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress
with any number of jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed
in the following order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the
prosecution has rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the
court, for good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time,
the court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the
defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the
defense argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the
argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for
argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the
alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may
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stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the
jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered.
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the
place in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which
any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to
them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no
person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so
himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into
court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to
separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that
it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or
suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on any subject
of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion
thereon until the case is finally submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been
received as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take
with him any notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by
himself, but none taken by any other person.
(I) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his
charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make
any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict,
and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any
person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in
charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The
court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond
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to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given.
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond
to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court,
in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in
the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be
sent out again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing
any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that
the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged
therein or any lesser included offense.
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Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are
to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause
sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further
challenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for
cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall
make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the
prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror
at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory
challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the
remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons
whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the
examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event, the court may permit counsel or the
defendant to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it
deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional
questions requested by counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for
the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure
from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing,
summoning and return of the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and
shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall specifically set forth
the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing
may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as
witnesses at the hearing thereon.
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(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of
jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause,
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the
evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for
cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three
peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court
may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit
them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may
be taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of
performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged
to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or
person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant,
which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable
minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a
verdict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or
a political subdivision thereof;
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(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a
criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict
after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the
defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction
regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the
carrying on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged
with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party
challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that
the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
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(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and
then by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed
before peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are,
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The
prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory
challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath
and enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the
person exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors,
in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter
in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the
evidence and the instructions of the court.
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76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. (1) If the court,
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which
the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction
as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided by law
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and
impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is
considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by
law for a class A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of
probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and
a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest
of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section
unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record
that the offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense
be reduced under this section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from
obtaining or being granted an expungment of his record as provided by
law.
Amended by Chapter 7,1991 General Session
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76-10-1903. Money laundering.
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering who:
(a) transports, receives, or acquires the property which is in fact
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, knowing that the property
involved represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity;
(b) makes proceeds of unlawful activity available to another by
transaction or transportation, or other means, knowing that it is intended
to be used for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of
specified unlawful activity;
(c) conducts a transaction knowing the property involved in the
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
with the intent:
(i) to promote the unlawful activity;
(ii) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of the property; or
(iii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter; or
(d) knowingly accepts or receives property which is represented to be
proceeds of unlawful activity.
(2) Under Subsection (1)(d), knowledge that the property represents
the proceeds of unlawful activity may be established by proof that a law
enforcement officer or person acting at the request of a law enforcement
officer made such representations and the person's subsequent
statements or actions indicate that the person believed those
representations to be true.
Amended by Chapter 17,1996 General Session
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61-1-21. Penalties for violations.
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or who
willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully
violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or
misleading in any material respect.
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1:
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to
be obtained was worth less than $10,000;
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more;
or
(ii) (A) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than
$10,000; and
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted
any money representing:
(I) equity in a person's home;
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the
Internal Revenue Code; or
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for
an indeterminate term of not less than three years or more than 15 years
if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more;
and
(ii) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted
any money representing:
(A) equity in a person's home;
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the
Internal Revenue Code.
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order
if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order.
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this
chapter, the sentencing judge may impose any penalty or remedy
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provided for in Subsection 61-1-20(2)(b).

Amended by Chapter 149, 2001 General Session

Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
No History for Constitution
Article I, Section 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny
others retained by the people.
No History for Constitution
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AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Amendment XIV
(1868)
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the
legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
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Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
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